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DLD-055        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 11-3680 & 11-3964 
___________ 
 
DONALD FRANCIS MACKAY, JR., 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KEENAN  MERCEDES BENZ;  
DAIMLER BENZ, MERCEDES BENZ PARENT COMPANY,  
STUTGART, GERMANY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-05134) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 1, 2011 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 6, 2011) 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
 
PER CURIAM  
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 Donald Francis MacKay Jr. challenges the District Court’s dismissal of his 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  For the following reasons, we will 
summarily affirm. 
 MacKay filed a pro se complaint against Keenan Mercedes Benz (“Keenan”) and 
“Daimler-Benz Stutgart [sic] Germany,” identified as Mercedes Benz’s parent company.  
He alleged that Keenan failed to repair a “very rare” 1962 Mercedes Benz that he brought 
in for servicing.  Additionally, he believes that Keenan shipped his car to Daimler-Benz 
in Germany and that Daimler-Benz is therefore liable for receiving stolen property.  The 
District Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint on the basis that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction because the parties were not diverse.  MacKay moved for 
reconsideration, but the District Court denied his motion.  MacKay timely appealed.  He 
thereafter filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the District Court dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction in light of MacKay’s pending appeal.  MacKay appealed that 
ruling as well, and we consolidated the appeals for resolution. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review 
over the jurisdictional question.  See Frett-Smith v. Vanterpool, 511 F.3d 396, 399 (3d 
Cir. 2008).   We may summarily affirm if no substantial question is presented by the 
appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 We agree with the District Court that it lacked jurisdiction over MacKay’s   
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complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
1
  MacKay represented in his complaint that 
he is a dual citizen of Canada and the United States who resides in Pennsylvania, and 
confirmed those facts in his second motion for reconsideration.
2
  Accordingly, he is 
considered a citizen of Pennsylvania for diversity purposes.  See Frett-Smith, 511 F.3d at 
400 (“We . . . hold that for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, only the American 
nationality of a dual national is recognized.”).  As Keenan is also a citizen of 
Pennsylvania,
3
 there is not complete diversity among the parties, as is required to 
establish diversity jurisdiction.  See Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 
412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010).  Our result should not surprise MacKay given our dismissal of 
his prior case against Keenan on the same basis.   Mackay v. Keenan Mercedes Benz, 340 
F. App’x 127, 128 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that “jurisdiction could not be based upon 
diversity of citizenship between the parties because Mackay and Keenan are both citizens 
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania”).  We also agree with the District Court’s 
dismissal of MacKay’s second motion for reconsideration.  See Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 
117, 120-21 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 As MacKay’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summary affirm. 
                                              
1
 As MacKay does not present a federal question, there is clearly no basis for jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
2
 Indeed, MacKay has used the same Pennsylvania address since 1994 in connection with 
over 20 appeals filed in this Court. 
3
 According to the District Court, Keenan is incorporated in Pennsylvania and has a 
registered office address in Doylestown, Pennsylvania. 
